Hackers hijack three country domains to mint counterfeit TLS certificates for Google

Hackers obtain counterfeit TLS certificates for Google and other large services

Hackers hijack three country domains to mint counterfeit TLS certificates for Google

Attackers seized control of the .gh, .sl, and .as country-code top-level domains, rewrote authoritative DNS records, and passed automated domain-control validation to obtain unauthorized TLS certificates for several Google domains and other major brands. Google updated Chrome to block the certificates it found and worked with the issuing certificate authorities to revoke them, but warned that browser-side fixes can't fully protect non-Chrome users or catch every affected domain.

While Chrome took steps during these incidents to identify and block suspected unauthorized certificates across the affected ccTLDs, browser-side intervention should not be relied on to protect your users.
  1. Borealid

    This sounds like something that HPKP ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Public_Key_Pinning ) could have prevented and CAA records ( https://letsencrypt.org/docs/caa/ ) could not. But HPKP is deprecated.

  2. iso1631

    So looks like

    1) Top level CC DNS entries were hacked

    2) CAA entries were removed (I assume google had them -- they do now CAA 0 issue "pki.goog"

    3) These were then used to verify issuing certificates against major CAs (letsencrypt etc) - for example by creating a new CNAME record for DNS verification

    Looking at google.as specifically shows Let's Encrypt issuing a certificate on 2026-09-27

    https://ctlogs.dev/search?q=google.as

    Google normally issues certificates with "Google Trust Services", presumably their in house CA which all browsers trust, but the only way to limit issuing to Google is with the CAA record.

    If you hijack DNS, you hijack certificate issuing. As several CAs exist with no business relationship to identify the real person asking for the certificate, you can do this anonymously. (If CAs required verification then you'd just have to chain this with the stolen credentials of someone who uses that CA so wouldn't be a major obstacle)

    From what I can tell (and the article conflates this with the diginoir so implies it), this was NOT a compromise of a Certificate Authority

  3. rswail

    The affected country ccTLDs are:

    AS: American Samoa

    GH: Greenland

    SL: Sierra Leone

  4. chrisjj

    Increasingly it seems domain cert issuance is too important to be left to computers. Shame we have no backup solution.

  5. TheChaplain

    I'm just waiting for Claude-powered hackers to break into the dns root system or bgp routing system. It's going to be a wreck :(

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