Active Directory Is the New Mainframe, and Machine Identity Is Breaking It
The Active Directory Era Is Finally Over

Active Directory worked because it answered three questions in one catalog: what identities exist, who vouched for them, and where they're valid. Cloud computing breaks that model. Machines now spin up and die on demand, and admins can't approve each EC2 instance or Kubernetes pod by hand. Auto-joining with admin tokens is security theater. The fix is federation via OIDC plus a secrets broker that acts as a meta-perimeter over hundreds of small ones.
Active Directory is the new mainframe: great for its time, but you'd never choose to start from scratch. Replacing it is impossible because it's so entrenched.
- bodeadly
A central point of this article seems to be claiming that adding a device in AD is an administrative bottleneck compared to cloud.
If that is the claim, it is false.
By default Authenticated Users have an "Add workstations to domain" capability (AKA ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota attribute on their account) that allows a regular user to create up to 10 machine accounts with zero admin intervention.
Machine accounts have limited rights compared to regular users.
AD provides fine grained distributed policy and cert managment.
After decades of emperical refinement, AD is often superior to what the cloud offers including Entra.
In environments with many PCs that require centrally managed policy, AD is still relavant and probably required.
I think it is also true that there are and always will be many companies that simply cannot expose these PCs to the cloud either because they're working with data that cannot be in the cloud like legal files, finanical documents, schematics or they cannot risk being tethered to the Internet.
You know that little micro PC attached to the cart in every exam room in a doctors office?
There is a 99% chance it is joined to AD.
- sirjaz
The funny thing is that AD has all the capabilities that are discussed here. Even AWS recommends it for kubernetes as a service account using gmsa: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECS/latest/developerguide/...
- OptionOfT
I remember in the past where we had users in AD, we'd sign in via ASP.NET, where we had to do something to allow that ASP.NET session to be elevated to one valid in Active Directory.
That session was then used to connect to Microsoft SQL Server where access to data was set at a company level.
It all flowed beautifully.
I remember having an issue with A user delegating to Service A which then delegated to Service B. That second hop is kinda special. Service A must be allowed to re-delegate.
(I quickly googled it) The solution was Constrained Delegation with Protocol Transition...
This brings back memories.
- breakwaterlabs
> Human approval doesn’t scale to developers creating and deprecating testing databases, Kubernetes clusters, and CI runners at will.
Service (or gMSA) accounts handle this, and auth-integrated reverse proxies can move parts of the problem into a more tractable place.
I feel like the article also conveniently forgets that kerberos/ldap backends for SSO systems are extremely common, and solve this.
> In Kubernetes, each pod gets a service account token, which allows it to assert its identity within the cluster.
How is this qualitatively different than onboarding a new computer object or gMSA entitlement in AD?
The problems that the blog asserts affect AD (how to onboard and delegate access and trust) are inherent in any sufficiently robust identity implementation.
- skinfaxi
Damn, did you really go and change the author after the comments?? https://web.archive.org/web/20261116141704/https://infisical...
When I originally read this I thought the submitter was the author.