U.S. Tightens Rules on Synthetic DNA Orders to Deter Bioterrorism
To deter bioterrorism, U.S. imposes new rules on ordering synthetic DNA
New U.S. regulations will impose stricter oversight on ordering synthetic DNA, targeting government-funded scientists who synthesize and manipulate sequences. Commenters on Hacker News are skeptical: DNA synthesis is closer to inkjet printing than plutonium, and anyone determined enough to build a biological weapon would barely be slowed by supply restrictions. Others note the rules mainly bind federally funded labs, not the terrorists they're meant to deter.
No one who is inclined to build a biological WMD is going to be more than mildly inconvenienced by supply restrictions. DNA isn't plutonium.
- the__alchemist
>Those vendors must verify their customers’ identities and screen orders for potentially dangerous sequences that, for example, could encode toxins or pathogens.
I'd assumed they already do this, and if you order Smallpox primers or w/e from Sigma/IDT you get a visit?
I have a home lab; wonder if there will be practical effects. Also have a personal project where I'm exploring enzymatic oligo synthesis. (Different set of pros/cons from the traditional phosphoramidite synthesis)
- whatever1
Why is everyone spooked by ai driven bioterrorism ? Like all of our water supplies are much easier to mess with compared to developing a virus or whatever that may or may not work
- AnotherGoodName
I'm curious if this is related to some things the top AI models are uncovering.
We know we don't get to see the bio side of the top models. They're out there solving hard maths problems etc but a query with the word 'microbes' in it often kicks you back to a smaller model automatically.
Are the bleeding edge models finding something scary enough that can be done with synthetic DNA that it needs to be restricted asap?
- gr-mk
This might impact me and a small handful of other people who have messing around with microbes in their apartment as a hobby. We'll see what happens.
- __MatrixMan__
The device used to make oligonucleotides is pretty much an inkjet printer, from there it's cleverly applied enzymes to assemble the full strand. If you've got the skills and determination to get the synthetic DNA into a functioning cell, I don't think limiting access to synthetic DNA in the first place is going to stop you.
- 3eb7988a1663
But Esvelt points out the policy only requires screening for DNA sequences 50 base pairs or longer. A would-be bioterrorist, he argues, could easily stitch together a dangerous sequence from much smaller fragments ordered from multiple different suppliers. Esvelt says he has built an algorithm capable of screening sequences as short as 30 base pairs for their risk potential and made it freely available. “That’s the main flaw in an otherwise pretty great policy,” he says. “Don’t bother building a fence if there’s going to be an obvious huge gap in it.”
So, a song and dance of doing something that will most likely just inconvenience people doing real work.
Also, DNA chemistry is very well established. Someone with the appropriate background could easily assemble oligos without too much difficulty. I guess this stops Little Johnny from printing ebola from the internet.
- King-Aaron
> U.S. government–funded scientists who make and manipulate DNA sequences will face tougher regulations
Seems like this has little to do with deterring terrorism then, considering the assumption that a terrorist may not be a US government funded scientist.
- Kim_Bruning
I want to say this is like banning the compilation of certain code snippets, but it's not like that, it's literally that. A bit weird.