# Dragos Planted 2 Million Canary Prompts in AI Services — and Caught Three Providers Being Breached

Original title: AI Supply Chain Security: What Canary Tokens Found

> Hacker News story 50596511 · language: en · submitted 2026-11-22
> Web version: https://zeli.app/story/50596511
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▲ 97 · by [kristianp](<https://news.ycombinator.com/user?id=kristianp>) · 💬 21
[original](<https://www.dragos.com/blog/ai-supply-chain-security-canary-tokens>) · [HN discussion](<https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50596511>)

## Summary

Dragos sent roughly two million prompts seeded with unique canary URLs and credentials to popular AI services over five months and tracked where they surfaced. The results: attackers were actively siphoning data from three hosting providers, marketplace resellers logged and reused customer prompts without any exploit, and privacy settings like Zero Data Retention were routinely ignored — including prompts routed to Chinese AI labs and a secret link that turned up in a Feishu chat weeks later.

## Key quote

> A privacy flag doesn't help when the attacker is already inside.

## HN discussion (21 comments)

### [jofzar](<https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50597174>)

> https://openrouter.ai/blog/announcements/data-processing-inc...
>
> Openrouters response.
>
> Honestly I'm not sure how anyone could ever trust them for ZDR ever again, they don't seem to be doing their due diligence. (See data residency below)
>
> \> This wasn’t limited to requests sent to the lab directly. Several U.S. hosting providers resell this lab’s models, and prompts sent to those providers triggered the exact same scraper – the prompts were flowing back to the lab. A customer who picked a U.S. provider specifically to keep their data in the U.S. didn’t get what they paid for.
>
> Edit: Thinking on this more, I don't see how they could have offered ZDR unless the "provider" has more skin in the game then them. The reason you trust Amazon/google with ZDR is because if they break contract/get caught out it will be a massive lawsuit and social/industry backlash.
>
> "Providers" via openrouter don't have that skin in the game, all the reputation is with openrouter and now that the trust chain is broken, I don't see how anyone in good faith could ever use them for their "zdr" or "hosting" location ever again.

### [matltc](<https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50597316>)

> Dodged a bullet. Been a vanilla CC user since the beginning, thought I might try these openrouters, they get talked up here quite a bit. In retrospect, it does seem obviously and wildly insecure, since you are now entrusting your data to hundreds of providers.

### [DotNetCorePowa](<https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50597410>)

> I almost went with openrouter this very week, but I decided to go with "umans" for the zdr...
>
> I am glad I didn't pick OR, but now can I trust the Belgian company... Hmm...

---

## Cite

- Page: https://zeli.app/story/50596511
- Date: 2026-11-22
- Source: dragos.com (https://www.dragos.com/blog/ai-supply-chain-security-canary-tokens)
- Hacker News: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50596511

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