FIPS 140-3 is not a security guarantee, and auditors know it
A sales engineer reveals that over 90% of customers who buy FIPS-enabled HSMs run them with FIPS mode disabled, paying a premium for a certificate they don't use. This article explains why that's often the right call: FIPS validation only covers a narrow module boundary, not the surrounding system, and can even freeze known-vulnerable code in the field. Examples like ROCA, EUCLEAK, and the YubiKey FIPS recall show certified products can be less secure than uncertified ones. The piece also benchmarks the real performance costs of FIPS mode and explores why the crypto industry largely ignores it.
A certificate can literally hold known-vulnerable code in the field.
- bob1029
Perhaps never a true guarantee, but level 4 HSMs are still impressive.
> The 4769 HSM has been verified to meet the FIPS 140-2 Level 4 requirements by protecting against attacks that include penetration of the secure module, side-channel attacks, and environmental failure protection (power or temperature manipulation). From the time of manufacture, the hardware is fully self-protecting. If tamper sensors detect a possible attack, all critical keys and other sensitive data are immediately destroyed and the HSM is rendered permanently inoperable. Note therefore that the 4769 HSM must be maintained at all times within the temperature, humidity, and barometric pressure ranges specified.
https://public.dhe.ibm.com/security/cryptocards/pciecc4/docs...
- afarah1
Huh, I don't know about the world of HSMs or crypto and their audits, but in FedRAMP SaaS, you absolutely have to run everything with FIPS mode enabled, there are strong guarantees that need to be in place and audited.
- sandeepkd
> Track the lifecycle, not the purchase.
In my experience this is the core issue with security. It has to be a continuous process in reality but its hard to justify the cost and resource allocation. For this reason it ends up being a point in time function leaving gaps over the life cycle of the product.